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Abstract
It is widely thought that education should aim at positive epistemic standings, like 
knowledge, insight, and understanding. In this paper, we argue that, surprisingly, in 
pursuit of this aim, it is sometimes necessary to also cultivate ignorance. We exam-
ine several types of case. First, in various circumstances educators should present 
students with defeaters for their knowledge, so that they come to lack knowledge, 
at least temporarily. Second, there is the phenomenon of ‘scaffolding’ in education, 
which we note might sometimes involve the educator quite properly ensuring that 
the student is ignorant of certain kinds of information. Third, if ignorance is lack of 
true belief, as a number of commentators have claimed, then in those cases in which 
students believe something truly without knowing it and teachers show that they lack 
knowledge, students may abandon that belief and thus become ignorant. In examin-
ing the role of ignorance in education, we explore exactly which kinds of ignorance 
are valuable in teaching situations and draw attention to important epistemic differ-
ences between ignorance on different levels.
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1  Education and ignorance
Education has many goals, such as the political goal of producing good citizens, 
or the economic goal of ensuring that education serves the economic interests of 
society. But one clear goal of education is epistemic. Indeed, this is arguably not 
simply one goal of education amongst many, but is rather a constitutive part of the 
educational enterprise, in the sense that a social practice that merely served politi-
cal, or moral, or prudential, or economic (etc.,) ends, and which didn’t also serve 
epistemic ends, would not be in the market to count as an educational practice in the 
first place.
It is a moot point what these epistemic ends are, however. At the very least, one 
would expect education to lead to useful cognitive skills and a body of true beliefs. 
Usually, however, educational theorists set the epistemic ends at a higher threshold. 
This might include, for example, the propagation of knowledge, or at least reasoned 
belief.1 Or it might involve setting the epistemic bar even higher, such as demanding 
the development of intellectual virtues and related epistemic standings like under-
standing.2 Yet, what all accounts of the epistemic ends of education have in common 
is that they focus on epistemically positive phenomena, such as rationality, knowl-
edge, understanding, insight, reliable belief formation, and the manifestation of the 
intellectual virtues.3
Given that the overarching epistemic goals of education are positive epistemic 
standings, one might well suppose that negative epistemic standings like igno-
rance—which is surely a paradigmatic negative epistemic standing—have no role 
to play in educational practices. We claim that this would be a mistake. In particu-
lar, while ignorance obviously cannot be one of the core epistemic goals of educa-
tion, we argue that nonetheless deliberately cultivating ignorance can sometimes be 
a bona fide educational practice.
One reason why an educational practice might be explicitly geared towards the 
generation of ignorance is that the epistemic ends of education are coming into con-
flict with its non-epistemic ends. Accordingly, there might be instances where, say, 
the social ends of education are served by overriding the epistemic ends and thereby 
promoting ignorance. Recently, for example, various philosophers have defended the 
moral value of ignorance, such as when it comes to ignorance of certain technologi-
cal possibilities, risks, and privacy.4 Accordingly, one might hold that similar con-
siderations could apply in the educational case to ensure that sometimes ignorance 
should be deliberately generated for non-epistemic reasons.
1 See, for example, Siegel (2017) for a defence of the idea that the development of critical rationality is 
central to the epistemology of education.
2 See Elgin (1999) for a defence of the centrality of the notion of understanding to education. See 
Pritchard (2013, 2016b, 2018, forthcoming) for a defence of the intellectual virtues as core epistemic 
goals of education (where understanding is treated as a manifestation of the intellectual virtues). See also 
MacAllister (2012).
3 For further general discussion of the epistemology of education, see Robertson (2009). See also the 
papers collected in Baehr (2016).
4 See, for example, Hansson (2017) and Miller (2017).
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Our interest in the role of ignorance in educational practices is not in the puta-
tive non-epistemic basis of cultivating ignorance, however. Rather, we want to sug-
gest that even if one sets aside non-epistemic factors, and thereby focuses only on 
epistemic considerations, it can nonetheless be the case that educators have reason 
to cultivate ignorance in their students. Moreover, we contend that such practices, 
properly understood, are entirely compatible with the idea that the overarching epis-
temic goal of education is the development of positive epistemic standings. In par-
ticular, where ignorance is generated in this way, it is in service of specifically (posi-
tive) epistemic ends.5
2  The varieties of ignorance
Before we can defend our positive claim, we first need to articulate what we take 
ignorance to be. For the purposes of this paper, our focus will be on propositional 
ignorance. This is because some of the epistemic phenomena—such as presenting 
someone with defeaters—do either work rather differently for or do not apply at all 
to knowledge by acquaintance and procedural knowledge (know-how). Moreover, 
we will take it that ignorance consist in either a lack of knowledge or a lack of a true 
belief in the target proposition. This disjunctive approach allows us to accommodate 
both of the main proposals in the literature. According to the so-called ‘Standard 
View’ of ignorance, to be ignorant with regard to a proposition is to lack knowl-
edge of that proposition.6 In contrast, according to the so-called ‘New View’ of 
ignorance, to be ignorant with regard to a proposition is to lack a true belief in that 
proposition.7 Our disjunctive treatment of propositional ignorance means that we do 
not need to take sides in this debate.8
Note that with ignorance so understood we can distinguish between various dif-
ferent kinds of ignorance, since there are a number of ways in which one can fail to 
know or truly believe the target proposition.9 This will be salient to our discussion 
5 See Pritchard (2016a) for a defence of the more general point that ignorance can have positive epis-
temic value.
6 This position is championed by Goldman and Olsson (2009) and Le Morvan (2011, 2012, 2013). See 
also Le Morvan and Peels (2016). Based on work in race studies, feminism studies, and agnotology, one 
might think that there are further varieties of ignorance to be distinguished, as El Kassar (2018) does. 
Elsewhere, one of us has argued that these fields concern various important accidental features rather 
than constitutive elements of the nature of ignorance—see Peels (2019b).
7 See Brogaard (2016) and Peels (2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2017a). See also Pritchard (forthcomingb) 
which argues that proponents of the Standard and New Views are obliged to incorporate a further condi-
tion to their accounts, such that ignorance involves the subject manifesting an intellectual failing qua 
inquirer. See also endnote 12.
8 Propositional ignorance is not the only kind of ignorance, though it will be our focus here. Nottelmann 
(2015), for example, distinguishes between three kinds of ignorance that correspond to the three-way 
distinction between propositional knowledge, acquaintance knowledge, and know-how/procedural knowl-
edge. What we are here calling propositional ignorance would only capture the first of these types of 
ignorance. In what follows when we refer to ignorance without qualification it will be propositional igno-
rance that we have in mind.
9 For more on these varieties of ignorance, see Peels (2019a).
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since it will enable us to clarify which type of ignorance might be properly culti-
vated within an educational practice.
The most straightforward ways in which one can be propositionally ignorant are 
disbelieving ignorance, where one actively disbelieves the target true proposition, 
and suspending ignorance, where one suspends judgment on the target true propo-
sition and so neither believes nor disbelieves it. In these cases one is aware of the 
target proposition and one has adopted a stance regarding it (to the extent that sus-
pension of belief constitutes a ‘stance’ at any rate), albeit not one of belief. Disbe-
lieving ignorance is arguably a worse form of propositional ignorance than suspend-
ing ignorance, in that one’s doxastic state is more divorced from how it should be 
(i.e., belief in the target true proposition). For one thing, it will usually take more 
evidence to bring someone from a state of disbelief to a state of belief than it takes 
to bring someone from a state of suspension to a state of belief (in the latter case, 
there are at the outset usually no considerations to the contrary).
There are also deeper kinds of ignorance where one isn’t even aware of the tar-
get proposition.10 In one variant of this case, while one has never considered the 
target proposition, one would believe it were one to consider it. Nonetheless, one is 
ignorant of it given that one doesn’t in fact believe the target proposition. Call this 
unconsidered ignorance. (This kind of case thus trades on the idea that a distinction 
can be drawn between dispositional belief and a disposition to believe).11 A more 
extreme case of ignorance of this kind would be where one is unaware of the target 
proposition and one would fail to believe it even if one were to become aware of it. 
Call this deep ignorance. Indeed, we can delineate an even more extreme case of 
ignorance of this general kind by stipulating that the subject lacks the conceptual 
resources to even grasp the proposition in question. Thus, even if the subject were 
to be told about this proposition she would lack the capacity to form a belief in this 
proposition. Call this complete ignorance.12
Note that if the Standard View of ignorance is the correct one rather than the 
New View of ignorance, then there will also be additional kinds of ignorance that 
specifically concern one’s failure to know the target proposition. For example, some-
one with a true belief in the target proposition might nonetheless be ignorant on this 
view because she fails to know it. Moreover, the manner in which she fails to know 
could reveal the extent of her ignorance, such that failing to know where one has 
an unjustified true belief manifests a more extensive form of ignorance than fail-
ing to know where one has a justified true belief (i.e., but where one’s true belief is 
Gettierized).
10 Note that there is arguably an intermediate kind of propositional ignorance whereby one has con-
sidered the target proposition and is as yet undecided about it (i.e., such that one doesn’t even suspend 
judgement). See Friedman (2017) for a defence of the idea that being undecided about a proposition is 
not the same as suspending judgment about it.
11 See Audi (1994) for a key work examining this distinction.
12 Note that on Pritchard’s (forthcomingb) account of ignorance, a failure to attain the relevant epis-
temic/doxastic standing (e.g., knowledge or true belief) is only one condition for ignorance. Accordingly, 
there can be, for example, propositions that one is completely unaware of but which one don’t thereby 
count as ignorant of (whether deep ignorance or otherwise). See also footnote 7.
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Finally, notice that propositional ignorance comes on different levels. In the basic 
case, one is ignorant of the proposition that p—say, that Antarctica is the largest 
desert on earth (which it is, surprisingly).13 We could dub this ‘first-order igno-
rance’. First-order ignorance often goes hand-in-hand with second-order ignorance, 
whereby one is ignorant of the fact that one is ignorant that p. Most people are not 
only ignorant of the fact that Antarctica is the largest desert on earth, for example, 
but are also ignorant of the fact that they are ignorant of this fact. First-order igno-
rance does not entail second-order ignorance, however, as one can exhibit the former 
without the latter. For example, most of us are well aware of our ignorance regarding 
the exact number of Amsterdam’s inhabitants (even though one could easily look it 
up), and hence while we are ignorant of this proposition, we are not ignorant of the 
fact that we are ignorant of it.14 This is true even if we have never explicitly con-
sidered whether we are ignorant of the exact number of Amsterdam’s inhabitants: 
we know that we are ignorant of this even if we have never consciously considered 
whether we are ignorant of this, pretty much in the same way as we know that we are 
less than 1456 feet tall, even if we have never considered this proposition.
All this is important, for it means that in defending the idea that we should also 
educate for ignorance, we should ask not only what the relevant kinds of ignorance 
are, but also on which level that ignorance is to be found.
3  Presenting defeaters
Sometimes we know something, or at least have an epistemic basis for believing it 
at any rate, until we run into defeaters. Defeaters are usually distinguished in terms 
of those that undermine the truth of what we believe (a rebutting defeater) and those 
that undermine our epistemic basis for believing it (an undercutting defeater). So 
being told by an authority that Antarctica is not the world’s largest desert would be a 
defeater of the first kind, while being told that one’s reason for believing that Antarc-
tica is the largest desert is problematic (e.g., that the webpage that was your source 
for this belief is unreliable) would be a defeater of the second kind.15 There can 
13 If you knew this already, here is a further, maybe even more surprising example. Most people are 
ignorant that there is a shrimp that has a specialized claw whose snap creates a cavitation bubble that 
releases a sound of up to 218 decibels (louder than a gun), while the cavitation bubble reaches tempera-
tures of over 4700 °C, almost as hot as the sun. Unsurprisingly, the shrimp is called ‘pistol shrimp’ (Alp-
heidae). (Thanks to Naomi Kloosterboer" for this wonderful example.) Nothing of what we say depends 
on the details of such examples.
14 Arguably, one can even have first-order knowledge while exhibiting second-order ignorance. If the 
Standard View of ignorance is correct, then this point is fairly straightforward, as most epistemologists 
will allow that knowing that p does not entail knowing that one knows that p. But one might even get a 
combination of first-order knowledge and second-order ignorance on the New View. For example, one 
might imagine a variant of Radford’s (1966) diffident schoolboy example such that the subject knows 
the target proposition but as a result of a moment of self-doubt no longer believes that he knows it (even 
though he does still believe it).
15 For the distinction, see Pollock (1986, p. 39). Note that some authors, such as Bergmann (1997, pp. 
102–103), distinguish a further type of defeater—no-reason defeaters—where no specific reason leads to 
the defeat. For further discussion of defeaters, see Sudduth (2008).
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clearly be an educational need to present defeaters (of either type), and for purely 
epistemic reasons. Indeed, as we will explain, although the presentation of defeaters 
can temporarily lead to ignorance, it can also be in the service of overarching epis-
temic goals in education, such as the promotion of knowledge and understanding.
Before we do so, though, a word on ‘epistemic reasons’. Some philosophers have 
argued that epistemic reasons to believe or to not believe something are reasons that 
bear on the truth value of the proposition (not) to be believed.16 That is not the kind 
of reason that we have in mind in this section. Rather, what we have in mind is a rea-
son to perform or not perform an action in order to achieve certain epistemic ends. 
As it happens, we believe that there can actually be epistemic reasons for actions.17 
However, the point of this section does not depend on that idea; all we want to argue 
is that there can be good reasons to cultivate ignorance in order to achieve epistemic 
ends.
Now, let’s consider a toy example. Suppose a student has a true belief which 
enjoys very weak epistemic support. Imagine that she truly believes that Antarctica 
is the largest desert on earth, but her only reason for believing this is that she over-
heard a classmate stating that this is the case. That’s certainly some reason to believe 
this proposition, but hardly a sufficient epistemic basis by itself for knowledge, par-
ticularly given the surprising nature of the claim in play. Recognizing the inade-
quacy of the student’s epistemic basis for this belief, the educator might adduce a 
defeater of either kind to provoke doubt, and thereby further inquiry, on the part of 
the student.
The most straightforward way of doing this is via appeal to undercutting defeat-
ers. For example, the educator might point out that forming a belief in this prop-
osition purely on the basis of overhearing someone assert it is not a very reliable 
manner of belief-formation. Rebutting defeaters can also be employed to serve the 
same purpose. For example, the educator might appeal to the surprising nature of 
the claim in play by asking the student how Antarctica could possibly be a desert 
given that there is an apparent abundance of snow and ice there (in fact, there is only 
an abundance of the latter). Notice that given the truth of the target belief this rebut-
ting defeater will be in its nature a misleading defeater as it is prompting the student 
to question something that is true. Nonetheless, there could be educational reasons 
to employ such a misleading defeater in the service of wider epistemic ends.
Either of these strategies could lead the student to abandon her true belief, if 
only temporarily. It would follow that on the New View of ignorance, at least, that 
ignorance was thereby generated. Interestingly, notice that undercutting and rebut-
ting defeaters tend to generate different doxastic responses in the subject, and hence 
different kinds of ignorance. While the former are apt to make the student suspend 
judgement about the target proposition (and thus lead to suspending ignorance), the 
latter are more likely to make the student disbelieve that proposition (and thus lead 
to disbelieving ignorance, which we noted above is arguably a worse kind of igno-
rance). Given the nature of the scenario, in neither case do we have unconsidered, 
16 E.g., Hieronymi (2006, 2005) and Kelly (2003).
17 For argumentative support for fort his position, see Peels (2017b, pp. 110–111).
1 3
Synthese 
deep, or complete ignorance. Notice too that we will tend to only have first-order 
ignorance generated in this case. Given that the student is aware of the defeater, she 
will also tend to be aware of her ignorance, and hence won’t exhibit second-order 
ignorance. In any case, the first-order ignorance in play is being generated by the 
educator precisely because she is trying to get the student to enhance her epistemic 
basis for this true belief, and not simply be content to accept it on such a weak epis-
temic basis. The ignorance is thus being cultivated by the educator in order to serve 
overarching epistemic goals.
Now one might think that the educational application of defeaters here was due 
to the specific fact that the agent’s epistemic basis for belief was sub-optimal. If that 
were right, then this would only be a point that applies to the New View of igno-
rance, and not also the Standard View, since it wouldn’t apply to cases where knowl-
edge, specifically, is replaced by ignorance. Interestingly, however, there can also 
be cases where defeaters are employed in an educational context to expressly target 
knowledge.
Imagine now that our agent, rather than forming her true belief about Antarctica 
being a desert by overhearing something that her classmate asserted, instead forms 
it by remembering that this information was passed on to her by someone authori-
tative (like another teacher). Now it seems to amount to knowledge. There might 
nonetheless be an educational purpose to offering defeaters to this belief, however. 
For example, suppose our educator wants to make the point that it is not enough to 
uncritically accept information from others, even authorities, particularly when the 
claim in question is surprising and an independent epistemic basis is easily attained 
(two conditions that obviously hold in this case). The educator would thus be mak-
ing an epistemic point about the importance of getting an especially secure epis-
temic basis for one’s beliefs when the circumstances demand it.
With this in mind, the teacher might query why the student is so willing to accept 
this belief solely on this basis. Could the informant have been mistaken? Could the 
student be misremembering, or misunderstanding, what the informant told them?18 
Here we have the presentation of undercutting defeaters designed to make the stu-
dent think more carefully about why she believes what she does. While undercutting 
defeaters are the most straightforward way of encouraging the student to reevalu-
ate her information source, one could also employ rebutting defeaters in this regard. 
Again, simply noting how very surprising this claim is could serve this purpose. As 
before, the rebutting defeater is more apt to generate disbelieving ignorance, in con-
trast to the suspending ignorance that the undercutting defeater is likely to produce, 
and the ignorance in play is likely to be only first-order. Notice too that both types of 
defeater are in this case misleading defeaters, given that the student in fact not only 
has a true belief, but also a true belief with a sufficient epistemic basis for knowl-
edge (at least prior to the presentation of the defeater anyway).
18 One might argue that simply querying an epistemic basis for belief in this way is not yet to offer a 
defeater as such. It is important to remember here, however, that this is not just anyone raising this query, 
but specifically a teacher who is occupying a privileged epistemic role in this regard. That the teacher is 
querying the epistemic basis for belief is a plausible defeater.
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The goal of introducing these defeaters is to prompt the student to undertake fur-
ther investigations, such as regarding the credibility of the informant, or to find inde-
pendent support for the claim in play. In doing so, the student is thereby putting 
her true belief on a firmer epistemic footing. These defeaters are thereby generating 
ignorance (by the lights of both the Standard View and the New View of ignorance), 
but only as a temporary state as a means to ultimately generating positive epistemic 
goods. In particular, the ignorance that is being generated is of a specific kind, in 
that it will tend to be either suspending or disbelieving ignorance (most likely the 
former), as opposed to unconsidered, deep or complete ignorance, and will only be 
first-order ignorance.
Now, one may object that if the ends here are truly epistemic, such as knowledge 
and understanding, there is a much quicker and more robust way of bringing about 
those ends. For, one can give further and better reasons for thinking that Antarc-
tica is the largest desert on earth, such as a detailed account of what it is for some-
thing to be a desert and scientific evidence regarding precipitation on Antarctica. 
We agree that that would be a good way to reach the epistemic ends of knowledge 
and understanding regarding the proposition that Antarctica is the largest desert on 
earth. But, of course, there are further epistemic ends to be reached and present-
ing defeaters before giving certain additional evidence may be a good way to reach 
those ends. Among those ends are: realizing the strength or weakness of one’s rea-
sons, the employment of epistemic virtues like curiosity and thoroughness, being 
more distinctive about when one can accept something on someone’s authority, and 
so on.
4  Educational scaffolding and ignorance
There is another way in which educational practices can promote ignorance for spe-
cifically epistemic reasons. This also involves factors that would prevent the student 
from knowing or having a true belief, though in a very different manner than that 
considered in the last section. Our concern before was with an educator introducing 
defeaters and thereby cultivating ignorance in her students. In contrast, our concern 
now is with how it might be important to an educational practice for the educator to 
actively ensure that students are ignorant of certain kinds of information by not even 
making that information available to them.
It is often important to the practice of good teaching that one is able to steer the 
student through the material that she is learning so as to make it manageable, and 
thereby enhance the student’s capacity for learning. In this way, for example, a com-
plex topic might be broken into digestible chunks, or the educator might bracket 
aspects of the subject matter that she recognizes as being particularly thorny until 
the student has mastered the basics. One can see the clear rationale for this, and 
why it is also a specifically epistemic rationale—if the student is overcome by the 
difficulty of the topic, then she will fail to learn anything, so it is important to the 
1 3
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educational goal of promoting learning that one ensures that this doesn’t happen. 
The metaphor that educationalists often use for this practice is scaffolding.19
What is interesting for our purposes is that educational scaffolding can sometimes 
quite properly lead to the cultivation of a specific kind of temporary ignorance on 
the part of the student. Consider the following scenario. The student is learning a 
new topic, algebra, say. The educator knows that the student will struggle with this 
topic, and so she gives her a selection of easy questions to tackle to begin with, and 
talks the student through each one. The student is growing in confidence, as she 
gets more and more of the easy questions right. But now it’s the end of the class and 
the educator needs to set some homework. Inevitably, she won’t be with the student 
while this is being completed. With this in mind, she looks through the questions 
in the textbook and makes a selection that she is confident the student can easily 
complete given what she has learnt so far. Importantly for our purposes, she doesn’t 
include in her selection some of the more difficult questions that she knows would 
throw off her student and cause her to doubt what she has learned so far. Indeed, she 
may go so far as to deliberately avoid directing students to material if there is other 
material proximate to it which she believes would undermine the student’s learning 
were she to become aware of it. In doing all this, the educator is ensuring that the 
student will successfully complete the homework and that her confidence in tackling 
this material will grow accordingly.
The scenario we have just described is a familiar case of educational scaffold-
ing in action. Notice how the educator is in effect creating an epistemically friendly 
environment for the student by excluding information that would prevent the student 
from prospering. In the process, however, she is ensuring that the student lacks true 
beliefs in certain propositions (and hence a fortiori lacks knowledge of these propo-
sitions), in that there will be aspects of the subject matter (questions about it, at any 
rate) that she is unaware of. Of course, the student didn’t have a true belief in these 
propositions previously, so the educator is not creating ignorance, but she is ensur-
ing that it is preserved. Moreover, she is doing so for epistemic reasons, since by 
preserving this ignorance she is helping the student to master the subject matter, and 
thereby acquire knowledge.
Let’s consider a second case, where the educator is plausibly creating rather than 
merely preserving ignorance. Imagine a physics teacher explaining the basic prin-
ciples of Newtonian physics to a student. It would be natural for such an educator 
to leave to one side just now the fact that such principles don’t apply to either very 
small or very large items in the universe, as such a complexity is unlikely to add 
anything to the discussion, but it might well confuse the student a great deal. This 
eliding of relevant information would thus be a case of educational scaffolding. But 
in not making this point explicit the educator is at least implying that these scientific 
principles have universal application. Indeed, given that educators normally mention 
restrictions of this kind, the student would be justified in making this inference. If 
19 See, for example, Foley (1994) and Simons and Klein (2007). This idea is often traced to Vygotsky’s 
(e.g., 1978) educational theory, and in particular his notion of the zone of proximal development—see, 
for example, Wood and Middleton (1975). For a useful recent overview of Vygotsky’s educational the-
ory, see Davydov and Kerr (1995).
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she does so, however, then she forms a false belief. The educational strategy, geared 
towards an overarching epistemic goal, is thus generating ignorance. Or perhaps we 
should say: generating a specific kind of ignorance, namely disbelieving ignorance, 
where the student used to be deeply ignorant before Newtonian mechanics was pre-
sented to her. The generation of ignorance is temporary, of course, as clearly this is 
a false belief that the educator plans to correct when the right time comes. Crucially, 
however, even if she becomes aware that the student has formed this false belief, 
then she would probably not correct it at this point, at least so long as it remains 
implicit.20
5  Understanding and ignorance
Notice that it is crucial to what is going on in the educational scaffolding case just 
described that the ignorance that the educator is effectively making use of as part of 
the scaffolding strategy is both first-order and second-order. That is, the student isn’t 
just ignorant of the target proposition, but also ignorant that they are ignorant of it, 
where the latter is important to preserve at this stage to bracket the relevant com-
plexities. The process of eventually removing this ignorance will naturally proceed 
by initially making clear to the student that there is second-order ignorance in play 
(i.e., such that she comes to realize what it is that she is ignorant of), as a first step 
towards ultimately removing the first-order ignorance.
Interestingly, the process of removing this ignorance—which is, of course, an 
educational strategy aimed at epistemic ends—might itself, at least temporarily, gen-
erate further ignorance. We can bring this point out by considering how education is 
often specifically focused on promoting understanding, which is an integrated body 
of knowledge, rather than just knowledge (or justified true beliefs, and so on) in a set 
of propositions. As we might say about the student in the Newtonian physics exam-
ple just described, while she now knows some very useful facts about physics, she is 
also ignorant of some fairly fundamental facts about physics too, and this means that 
she has a quite basic lack of understanding of this subject matter. But consider what 
would happen once the student is made aware of this lack of understanding. The 
very rationale behind the educational scaffolding strategy to bracket these complex 
facts would also explain why a student, upon becoming aware of this lack of under-
standing, might temporarily lose her confidence in more propositions regarding this 
subject matter than just the ones that she is ignorant about.
The educational goal of promoting understanding, and thereby removing the stu-
dent’s ignorance in this regard, might thus temporarily lead her to suspend belief in 
true propositions that she previously believed (and indeed knew). Again, then, we 
have a case of an educational strategy, geared towards an overarching epistemic end, 
20 It is important that the student’s false belief remains implicit in this way, for if she makes explicit to 
the educator that she holds this false belief, such as by stating it to her, then it will be incumbent upon the 
educator to say something. Educational scaffolding is not meant to legitimatise outright lying on the part 
of the educator, after all!
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temporarily generating (suspending) ignorance. What is different about this case, 
however, is that the generation of ignorance is more an unwanted side-effect of the 
educational strategy, rather than being an explicit part of it. The educator’s overarch-
ing goal is not the generation of ignorance, but rather the promotion of the student’s 
understanding—indeed, the educator ultimately aims to eliminate the student’s igno-
rance. It is just that attaining the latter goal sometimes involves temporarily generat-
ing ignorance.
6  Showing that the student doesn’t know
Imagine that a student truly believes some proposition, but doesn’t know it. The 
student may fail to have knowledge for a variety of reasons. Maybe she believes 
the proposition in question merely out of wishful thinking, or the way she formed 
that belief was clearly unreliable. Once it becomes clear to an educator that a stu-
dent holds a true belief but lacks knowledge, it is only natural for the educator to 
want to explain to the student why knowledge is lacking even though her belief is 
true.
One way of doing this might involve providing the student with a sufficient 
epistemic basis in the target proposition, and hence ensuring that she has knowl-
edge. In the simplest case, for example, telling a student that something she 
believes is true, but that her reasons for holding it are inadequate for knowledge, 
will thereby lead to the student having knowledge, since she will now base her 
true belief on the reliable testimony of the educator. Alternatively, the educator 
might go further to actually articulate the reasons why this true belief ought to 
be held, in which case the student now has both the educator’s testimony and the 
epistemic basis that they have articulated as grounds for their knowledge.
These types of cases are not our concern, however, but rather scenarios where 
the educator has good educational reasons why she would want to make the stu-
dent aware that she lacks knowledge without in the process supplying the student 
with an epistemic basis that would enable her to have the target knowledge. In 
particular, it might be important to the educator that the student identifies the 
epistemic basis for her true belief herself. The reason why such cases are interest-
ing for our purposes is that if the student is given good reasons for thinking that 
she lacks knowledge, without at the same time being given a new epistemic basis 
for this true belief, then this will ordinarily lead to the student losing her belief, 
at least until she identifies a new epistemic basis for believing it. After all, if one 
is convinced that one lacks an adequate epistemic basis for believing a proposi-
tion, then one will lose one’s confidence that this proposition is true, which would 
mean no longer believing it.
What is interesting about such cases is that they involve the employment of 
an educational practice that leads the student to lose her true belief. At least on 
the New View of ignorance, it follows that this educational practice is generating 
ignorance (in the normal case, this would be suspending ignorance, as the subject 
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is likely to now suspend judgement about the target true proposition). Moreo-
ver, notice that the educational practice is clearly geared towards specifically 
epistemic ends, as the educator’s goal is to encourage the student to identify an 
adequate epistemic basis for the belief herself (e.g., to go look up the proposition 
in question in a reliable way, such as in a reference work, and thereby establish its 
truth).
This wouldn’t be a case of an educational practice generating ignorance on 
the Standard View, of course, as the student was already ignorant of the target 
proposition by the lights of this proposal (as the student lacked knowledge before 
the educational intervention, and still lacks knowledge afterwards). Nonetheless, 
such cases are still significant even for exponents of the Standard View. This is 
because they concern an educational intervention where ignorance is maintained 
rather than removed, even though it would have been very straightforward for the 
educator to have removed the ignorance in question. Moreover, notice that the 
educator’s intervention, even though it is geared towards specifically epistemic 
ends, actually results in the student’s epistemic position becoming more removed 
from being knowledge than before (in that the student previously at least had a 
true belief in the target proposition, whereas after the intervention she doesn’t 
even have that). The educator is thus still in an important sense cultivating igno-
rance via her intervention, even by the lights of the Standard View.
One may wonder how this variety of ignorance generation or maintenance serves 
positive epistemic goods. After all, in the scenario at hand, the student abandons a 
true belief. It seems to us that various epistemic goods are served even in this kind 
of scenario. First, in the new situation, even though the student no longer believes 
the truth, her doxastic attitude at least matches her evidential situation and that is 
an epistemically good thing.21 A doxastic attitude—in this case suspension of judg-
ment—that matches one’s evidential situation is, at least in one of the many sense 
of ‘rationality’, an epistemically rational attitude, while belief where one’s evidence 
warrants only suspension of judgment is not. Second, even though this situation 
will not come with a true belief in the object proposition, it may come with other 
true beliefs and even knowledge—clearly, other epistemic goods. For, the first-order 
ignorance in a situation like this will often come with second-order knowledge. For 
example, if a teacher shows a student that her belief is based on wishful thinking and 
that the student, upon seeing that this is right, abandons the belief and ends up with 
suspension of judgment, she will often come to know such things as: (1) my previ-
ous belief was irrational, (2) my previous belief did not fit the evidence, (3) I have 
abandoned that belief, (4) my current attitude—that of suspension of judgment—
matches my evidence, (5) my current attitude towards the proposition is rational, 
and so on.
21 That this is a good thing has been argued in detail by Conee and Feldman (2004). Feldman (2002, pp. 
378–379) has even argued that rationality or reasonableness is the goal or aim of belief.
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7  Concluding remarks
In this article, we have focused on the instrumental role that ignorance cultivation 
can play in educational practices in aiming at various epistemic ends, such as knowl-
edge and understanding. We have focused on propositional ignorance; whether 
mutatis mutandis the same applies to objectual ignorance and procedural ignorance 
is an issue that needs further inquiry.
We have argued that there are at least three ways in which teachers can properly 
aim at ignorance in their students: (1) sometimes one should present students with 
defeaters for their knowledge, (2) scaffolding in education can come with ensuring 
that the student is ignorant, and (3) sometimes teachers should show that students 
lack knowledge regarding a particular issue. In each of these cases, the teacher aims 
at temporary and first-order ignorance in their students. In the first and third cases, 
this comes with second-order knowledge of such first-order ignorance. In the case of 
scaffolding, a teacher may even maintain second-order (say, deep) ignorance in his 
students of their first-order ignorance.
Importantly, we have assumed that the teacher in question has not only the will 
but also the ability to lead the student out of the ignorance in question. If the student 
sticks with the ignorance or if there is good reason to think that the teacher will not 
be able to lead the student away from the temporary ignorance, then the ignorance-
inducing strategy will not have the kind of epistemic value that we discussed. We 
are, thus, talking about cases in which things go well—in such cases, temporarily 
inducing ignorance has epistemic value.
We should note that what we have argued is an instantiation of a more general 
phenomenon: love of truth can and sometimes should manifest itself in a wide vari-
ety of strategies that promote ignorance. Scientific research, judicial inquiry, and 
journalistic investigation sometimes aim at maintaining ignorance in order to pursue 
epistemic ends, for instance by neglecting or leaving aside what are considered to 
be details or irrelevancies in order to focus on what matters. Political campaigns 
and projects in media can aim at maintaining ignorance, for instance, by avoiding or 
ignoring what is considered to be misleading evidence. Here, we have unearthed a 
variety of educational strategies that aim at generating or maintaining ignorance in 
order to reach certain epistemic ends in the long run. We leave it for another time 
to explore whether these specific strategies are unique to the realm of education or 
whether they can be found elsewhere as well.22
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